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Does the reference to a mental realm in using the notion of mental disorder lead to a
dilemma that consists in either implying a Cartesian account of the mind-body relation or
in the need to give up a notion ofmental disorder in its own right? Many psychiatrists seem
to believe that denying substance dualism requires a purely neurophysiological stance for
explaining mental disorder. However, this conviction is based on a limited awareness of the
philosophical debate on the mind-body problem. This article discusses the reasonableness
of the concept of mental disorder in relation to reductionist and eliminativist strategies in
the philosophy of mind. It is concluded that we need a psychological level of explanation
that cannot be reduced to neurophysiological findings in order to make sense of mental
disorder.
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For some time, especially in the 60s and 70s of the twentieth
century, psychiatry was under pressure because it did not seem
capable of showing that mental illness actually exists. Can there
really be such a thing as a “disease of the mind”? At the time
skeptics such as Thomas Szasz (1974) wrote against the “myth
of mental illness.” The emphasis of this debate lay for a long
time in the scrutiny of the associated norms, i.e., the question
whether one can differentiate between sick or healthy mental
phenomena. One still visible effect of this debate, which has
more or less reached its conclusion, is the avoidance of the term
“disease” in the official nomenclature of psychiatric medicine.
Nowadays we speak of disorders, not diseases, for example in the
Diagnostic and StatisticManual ofMental Disorders (DSM), or in
the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (ICD), in which the psychiatric classification is
also described as “mental and behavioral disorders.” One cannot
help feeling that the attempt had been to avoid a definition that
is already all too close to somatic medicine, which would have
required a corresponding “hard” validation of the respective cat-
egories, or at least a set of explanations of the nosological units
in these classification systems. Because contemporary psychiatry
barely meets this idea, one could get out of this whole affair with
a “weaker” term1.
The downside of this difficulty is visible in the likewise wide-
spread somatization of psychopathology, which—put briefly—is
the identification of mental disorders as diseases of the brain, a
practice that has a long tradition in the history of psychiatry.
All efforts are undertaken to establish psychopathological phe-
nomena as “real,” precisely because many psychiatrists share the
view that psychiatry has to be scientifically demonstrable and
ought to put in place generally testable criteria for pathological
conditions, and because it is somewhat embarrassing for them
to separate “disorder” from the disease concept in such a way.
Because the real is in turn considered to be one and the same as
1In this paper I use “disease,” “illness” and “disorder” synonymously.
the observable, from this point on the material disorder of the
brain counted as what ideally should be proven. The move had
some initial plausibility, in that one more aspect of the original
skepticism toward the concept of disease in psychiatry could be
undermined. This doubt was fed by the supposedly non-existing
location of the disturbance: the spirit or the psyche. How can one
rationally assume scientifically valid criteria of pathology when
the impaired or damaged object apparently does not exist, or at
the very least cannot be affected by disorders? The answer lay in
tossing away significant reference to the psyche, the mind, or to
mental objects, and talking mainly about neurophysiology, the
nervous system, and the brain; for instance when schizophrenia
was regarded as a disorder of dopamine and serotonin levels. The
somatization could therefore solve both problems of psychiatry:
its ostensibly poor scientific grounding and the supposed lack of
reality of its phenomena. One astonishing result of this devel-
opment lay furthermore in the fact that leading proponents of
psychiatry now claim—just as their strongest critics once had—
that mental illnesses do not actually exist, because only brain
disease exists. From a philosophical perspective such a conclusion
seems unreasonable2.
The proponents of the concept of disease in psychiatry, how-
ever, seem to be left indeed in an uncomfortable dilemma: If
they emphasize the bodily manifestation of mental diseases, then
they save the analogy to somatic disease and therefore the med-
ical terminology. At the same time they stand to lose through
this strategy the uniqueness of mental disease, which is reduced
to somatic disease. If one wants on the other hand to keep the
distinctive manner of speaking of mental disease (or disorder),
then this is apparently only possible when one at the same time
postulates a sphere of the mind that is distinct from the body.
This strategy, again, seems to lead to a mind-body-duality in the
mode that has become unpopular in philosophy. The supposed
2In this contribution I draw on considerations that were published first in
German in my book Schramme (2000).
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dilemma for proponents of the concept of mental disease there-
fore consists in the choice between the Scylla of reduction and the
Charybdis of dualism. “Psychiatry is left with two seeming alter-
natives: either to say that personal, psychological, and emotional
disorders are really states of the body, objective features of brain-
tissue, the organism-under-stress, the genes or what have you; or
else to deny that such disorders are illnesses at all” (Sedgwick,
1973).
As already indicated, there are authors, especially on the side
of psychiatry, who are ready to solve this dilemma by consis-
tent somatization and consequentially abandoning the concept
of mental disease. One prominent example for this is Robert
Kendell (1993, 3), a well-known British psychiatrist: “[. . .] it
follows that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as dis-
ease of the mind or mental disorder and that Griesinger was
right—mental illnesses are diseases of the brain, or at least
involve disordered brain function—because all mental events
are accompanied by and dependent on events in the brain.
(Thomas Szasz was also right; mental illness is a myth, though
not for the reasons he believed.).” A surprising alliance between
biological psychiatrists and skeptics has been formed; in the
end both positions are ready to give up the concept of mental
illness.
The task of this article is therefore to search for compelling
arguments in favor of a distinctive concept of mental illness. As
already indicated, I cast doubt on the presented dilemmatic struc-
ture as a defense of this concept. Rather, I shall try to show that
there are well-reasoned positions somewhere between the two
horns of the dilemma. The question—can we see “mental ill-
ness” as an autonomous concept without relying upon unpleasant
theoretical premises?—is, as I have said, based on an important
philosophical issue: the mind-body problem. This problem can
be formulated as follows: Are there really mental phenomena,
and if so, how can they be explained and how are they con-
nected with physical phenomena? The first part of this question
may sound rather strange, since what are we more sure of than
that mental states such as pain, wishes and beliefs exist?3 In the
course of this investigation it will become clearer—so I hope at
least—why questioning the existence of mental phenomena is
not as strange as it seems. The second part of the mind-body
problem, the question of the nature of mental phenomena and
their relation to physical states, has of late, with the study of the
brain and the nervous system, received a strong empirical orien-
tation and even a new twist. The idea that the nervous system
and especially the brain are the basis of mental states is nowadays
3This assumption in reference to the existence of the mental on the basis
of its experiential aspects has also once again gained some weight recently
in philosophy of psychiatry. To this end new phenomenological approaches,
such as those from Fuchs (2004), Gallagher and Vaever (2004), or Ratcliffe
(2008), have taken up the experiential attributes of mental disorders. From
this perspective we could claim that the challenge of the mental by somati-
zation is itself drawing upon a dualistic starting-point. In virtue of doubting
distinct properties of the mental realm, somatization accordingly even results
in a rejection of one aspect of human existence, i.e., the mental, which, how-
ever, cannot be separated from human corporeality. The contrasting holistic
perspective becomes prominent in the concept of Leib (lived body), which
accordingly plays an important role in the phenomenological tradition.
no longer seriously disputed. For this reason the mind-body
problem is sometimes reformulated as the “mind-brain prob-
lem.” The assumption that mental phenomena are based upon
physiological processes suggested itself after the observation of
people with brain injuries. Since the introduction of new imag-
ing techniques to study the brain’s physiological processes, this
theory has been strengthened and refined. Today we can iden-
tify connections between regions in the brain and specific mental
capabilities, even if definitive relationships between them are not
yet possible. And ultimately we are still far away from being
able to formulate a generally accepted solution to the mind-body
problem.
In this article I will first briefly focus on Thomas Szasz, the
main critic of the concept of mental illness. Here I will examine
especially his arguments that are related to the mind-body prob-
lem4. Second, I will apply reductionist and eliminative theories in
the philosophy of mind in order to find out whether they might
rule out the concept of mental illness.
THE SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS OF THOMAS SZASZ
Like no other theorist, Szasz has dealt with the concept of dis-
ease in psychiatry in a very intensive way, and has attempted to
demonstrate particularly the different disanologies between the
concept of disease in somatic medicine and psychiatry. The con-
cept of disease—as Szasz has put it in the argument that interests
us—cannot be applied to mental phenomena, because the expres-
sions “body” and “mind” belong to different logical categories.
When we speak of mental illness, we are merely using the term as
a metaphor.
In this argument Szasz relies upon the British philosopher
Gilbert Ryle (1949), who, in his book The Concept of Mind,
attacked the “official doctrine” of Cartesianism, in which every
human being possesses both a body and a mind, which exist as
independent entities. Ryle also called this position the “dogma of
the ghost in the machine.” He wanted to refute this position by
showing that it is based on a so-called category mistake. Szasz
uses Ryle’s approach in order to demonstrate that the “official
doctrine” of psychiatry commits an identical category mistake, in
virtue of assuming that there is both bodily illness and mental ill-
ness. Themistake consists in the claim that the mind can, just like
the body, be affected by illness.
Ryle explains his conception of a category mistake by way of
several examples. Suppose that a student comes to Oxford for
the first time. There she is given a tour of the many colleges,
libraries, and administrative offices. After the tour she says: “I now
know the individual colleges and where the books are kept, and I
have also seen where the administrators work. But now I want to
be shown the university.” Naturally this wish cannot be fulfilled,
because colleges, libraries, etc. are the university. There is no other
point of interest that is called “university.” Apparently the student
does not know that “university” belongs to a category separate
from “New College,” “Bodleian Library,” etc. It would be a simi-
lar mistake to ask, after one had been shown the functions of the
4A more extensive critical evaluation of Szasz’s position, and of other critics
of the concept of mental illness, can be found in Schramme (2004).
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defender, the forward, and the goalkeeper etc., whose function it
was to contribute the team spirit in a football team.
The mistake of Cartesianism is given, according to Ryle, in
such amixing of categories, in that “mind” is classified in the same
logical category as “body.” Only in this way could it be claimed
that a human being has both a mind and a body. But one could
only combine expressions in linguistically correct conjunctions
when they belong to the same category. Therefore, one cannot,
from a linguistic point of view, state, for example that one has
seen New College, Bodleian Library, and Oxford University.
Ryle does not claim that the mind cannot be said to exist as
a matter of principle. But if this claim is made, one would need
another meaning of “exist” than in the assertion that bodies exist.
Because mind and body belong to different categories, it cannot
be reasonably claimed that mind and body exist in the same way.
Nor can it be expressed in a logically compelling way that either
the mind or the body exists, because this disjunction is just as
inadmissible when expressing different categories. To say, “Either
I have visited the New College, the Bodleian Library etc. or seen
the university” is patently absurd.
At this point Szasz (1974) wants to show that because “body”
and “mind” belong to different logical categories, in principle
there can be no such thing as a mental illness. This theory and its
basis—the category mistake argument—are important for Szasz’s
work and are mentioned again and again, even when there is no
direct relation to Ryle, such as when Szasz says that an illness can
only affect the body.
As previously mentioned, Ryle’s category mistake argument
is directed at the “official doctrine” that had prevailed after
Descartes and that postulated two distinct entities: the body and
the mind. The special feature of Ryle’s argument as compared to
other critiques of dualism is his claim that asking about the rela-
tionship between mind and body is already by itself non-sensical
(Ryle, 1949, 23). But even if this view is correct, the category mis-
take argument alone does not support Szasz’s theory, because the
mere suggestion that “mind” and “body” belong to different cat-
egories does not allow the conclusion that a mental illness cannot
exist. The argument does not express whether mental phenomena
exist or not, but rather casts doubt on Cartesianism.
Moreover, illness does not exist independent from organisms.
If one abandons the notion of an independent existence for ill-
ness, the idea of actual mental illness is no longer implausible,
because we need not claim that the mind has an illness, but rather,
as one could say for example, a disorder of mental capacities—
however specified—is amental illness. In order to make this claim
one would not have to postulate a separation between mind and
body. Substance dualism is not required for the maintenance of
the concept of mental illness. Therefore, Szasz cannot show the
absurdity of this concept in principle through casting doubt on
the Cartesian separation of mind and body.
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
There are many different theories about the relationship between
mental and physiological states. These theories range from strict
separation of the two spheres to their identification, or lead all
the way to the claim that the mind-body problem is princi-
pally unsolvable. This situation and the enormous scale that the
respective literature has since reached make it necessary to restrict
this examination to a cursory treatment and to keep as strictly
as possible to the issue at stake. For this reason I will largely
restrict myself to negative statements in order to defend the con-
cept of mental illness, and will attempt to show accordingly that
the theories that doubt the explanatory independence of mental
phenomena are not adequately justified to reject such an auton-
omy 5. Positive criteria of such evaluation of theories would be
their scientific adequacy—this spoke against Cartesian dualism—
but also their philosophical plausibility, of course. Still, I cannot
deal with all of the many contributions in this area of research.
Theories of the relation between mind and body that lead to a
questioning of the mental disease concept are largely of two kinds:
Either they are reductive—they lead to an explanation of mental
phenomena through reference to physiological states; or else they
are eliminative—they relegate mental phenomena to the sphere of
myth that is, dispute the very existence of mental states. I naturally
do not want to claim that the respective authors actually want to
discard the notion of mental illness. Ultimately their theories are
aimed at a different question. But it is possible to scrutinize the
independence of the mental disease concept on the basis of such
theories and in doing so to ultimately scrutinize the identity of
psychology and psychiatry. And I think furthermore that implicit
or explicit theories about the connection between mind and body
can have an impact on psychiatry’s research focuses, its methods
of treatment, and its classifications.
From this point on I will take it for granted that the problems
of substance dualism, such as those exemplified in Descartes, are
already well-known. In the following I will first analyse the reduc-
tive theories on the mind-body problem. Then I will examine
the eliminative theories. The result will show that the rejection
of an independent concept of mental illness does not succeed.
A conceptualization of mental disease by referring to mental
states is possible without having to advocate an awkward dualism.
Nevertheless, we should not go so far as to generally repudiate
somatic approaches in psychiatry, but rather emphasize their one-
sidedness and their need to be complemented. Psychiatry should
be neither “mindless” nor “brainless”.6
IDENTITY-THEORY
The mind-body identity theory makes reference to mental states,
which underlie our actions, and therefore it does not reduce them
5Unfortunately there is still very little cooperation between philosophy and
psychiatry regarding this specific issue as well as the underlying mind-body
problem. The psychiatric literature is relatively unaffected by the elaborate
debates in philosophy. In turn, a theory in philosophy will still seldom be
examined against concrete examples, such as those found in psychiatry. It
would be important to achieve stronger cooperation here, and on the whole
I see this article to be an attempt at mediation. There are in the mean-
time some interesting publications that are headed in this direction. To
highlight just a few: Wilkes (1988); Graham and Stephens (1994); Griffiths
(1994); Northoff (1997); Ghaemi (2003); Radden (2004); Murphy (2006);
Bolton (2008); Kendler and Parnas (2008); Graham and Stephens (2010), and
Graham and Stephens (1994) founded periodical Philosophy, Psychiatry &
Psychology; see also Schramme and Thome (2004).
6Eisenberg and Lipowski coined the terms “mindless” and “brainless” psychi-
atry (compare Sullivan (1990), p. 271).
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to observable behavior, as behaviorism had done previously, ulti-
mately leading to a theoretical dead end. Identity theory permits
explanations of behavior that appeal to desires, beliefs, pain, etc.,
and seems in this regard adequate to work as a basis for an expli-
cation of the mental illness concept. However, the theory posits
the ontological identity of mental states and neurophysiological
states. In this way identity theory rules out substance-dualistic
assumptions. Mental states are identical to physiological states of
the nervous system and the brain. There are not two different
substances, only one, namely matter. The mental does not have
any properties that go beyond the physiological7. One often cited
example for this is the identity of pain with the stimulation of
C-fibers.
Identity theory is superior to behaviorism not only thanks
to its appeal to inner states, but also through its ability to
acknowledge different mental phenomena in cases of identical
observable behaviors. For identical behaviors can have many dif-
ferent underlying mental states, which are themselves identical
to specific neurophysiological states. Therefore, for instance the
same behavioral abnormality could in one case be accompanied
by a neurophysiological irregularity that is completely missing in
another case. On the basis of such a theory this suggests search-
ing for the boundaries between mental normality and illness on
a neurophysiological level, because on this level different mental
states manifest themselves. The first step to a theory about men-
tal illness as a brain illness is therefore fulfilled. Identity theory
also solves Descartes’s problem of explaining mental causation,
for instance the causation of the action of going to the fridge by a
desire to drink and a belief that there is a drink in the fridge. On
the basis of substance dualism such a straightforward explanation
becomes quite difficult to achieve, because mental phenomena
are regarded as non-material in Cartesianism, and non-material
things lack the force to cause anything physical. However, if men-
tal states are identical to neurophysiological states, then there is no
need to postulate an obscure non-mental causality. Mental states
can cause material changes to the body in virtue of their material
existence.
We should clarify what the identity theorists mean by “iden-
tity.” J. J. C. Smart (1959, 171), one of the prominent proponents
of identity theory, speaks of “strict identity” and uses the iden-
tity of lightning and electric discharge as explanatory example.
The thesis is stronger than a mere claim to a correlation between
brain states and mental phenomena. This type of identity is often
explained using Leibniz’s law of the identity of indiscernibles: X is
strictly identical to Y if they are indiscernible from one another,
i.e., if every property of X is also a property of Y, and vice versa. In
the present case of an identity claim, this means that there are
no properties of the mental that are not also properties of the
nervous system. Hence there is no unique property of the mental.
The proposition of identity theorists is not tantamount to the
claim that statements about mental and neurophysiological states
have the same meaning, and are therefore synonymous. The iden-
tity theory merely claims that the state being referred to is one
7It is meant thereby that every mental state can in principle be fully explained
exclusively in reference to neurophysiological processes. Compare for example
Smart (1959) p. 54.
and the same. We can elucidate this distinction with the follow-
ing example: The Evening Star is identical with the Morning Star
(both have the same properties of the planet Venus, and so refer
to the same object), although the terms have different mean-
ings, because there are “different modes of presentation” at hand
(Frege, 1892).
Smart (1959) emphasizes the difference between synonymity
and identity in order to avoid one obvious objection to identity
theory. For there’s room to claim that mental and physical states
are not identical, because someone who has no idea of neurophys-
iology can nonetheless refer to his mental condition. If the two
states were identical, so this argument goes, then we could substi-
tute the proposition in a statement such as “I know that my foot
hurts” with the proposition “my brain is in state X” while retain-
ing the truth value. Since this clearly does not work, the states
cannot be identical. This only shows, however, that statements
about mental states have a different meaning than statements
about physical states, not that they are not ontologically identi-
cal. Therefore, this kind of argumentation against identity theory
is invalid.
In the distinction between meaning and reference there is also
the implication that the postulated identity of mental and physical
statements is informative (i.e., not a priori). In its differentiation
between types of identity statements such as “a bachelor is an
unmarried man,” “a square is an equilateral rectangle,” and the
like, identity theory contains an assertion of a contingent, empir-
ically verifiable fact. Mental states could also be identical with
completely different states, but it has been established by science
that they are identical with neurophysiological states.
Still, the critique of identity theory was not hard to
come by. At this point two variations of objections can be dis-
tinguished 8. Firstly, the neurophysiological side of the identity
proposition has been the starting point for objections. Here the
argument of “multiple realizability” is especially pertinent. In the
case that indistinguishable mental states could each be realized
through different brain states, they would not, contrary to the
proposition of identity theory, be identical to specific neurophys-
iological states after all. Secondly, it is questionable whether men-
tal states in their usual taxonomy can be rendered at all as identical
with any underlying brain states. The terminology, with which we
categories mental states as desires, hopes, etc., has been around
long before anyone ever had any insight into brain processes, and
it seems therefore unlikely that clear equivalents can be found.
The identity theorists postulate a strict identity of mental
states and neurophysiological states. The proposition is that indis-
tinguishable mental phenomena each correspond to the same
physiological states. But, as the objection goes, it is not only con-
ceivable, but even extremely likely that many animals experience
states of consciousness such as for example pain. Yet the nervous
system and brains of many animals vary widely from those of
8Here I ignore a whole line of objections, which deal with so-called qualia that
is, the specific, felt qualities of a mental state. These objections are not limited
to the identity theory introduced here, but rather are in part turned in general
against physicalism, disputing therefore that mental states possess exclusively
physical attributes. The best known versions of these objections come from
Nagel (1974) and Jackson (1982, 1986).
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humans. Therefore, it is completely unlikely to ever be able to
identify specific neurophysiological states with mental states. A
bird’s feeling of pain, or that of a perhaps unknown creature,
could be based on radically different physiological states. This
is one possible way of formulating the argument of “multiple
realizability.”
The objection itself was first advanced by Hilary Putman
(1967). For strong forms of identity theory it has proven to be
fatal, but not necessarily for weaker ones. Putnam supports iden-
tity theory with a strong proposition. He claims that the theory
has to show, for example that a feeling of pain can always be iden-
tified with a specific neurophysiological state. If, however, differ-
ent physical states can accompany the same mental state (feelings
of pain), then this proposition falls apart. “Consider what the
brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has
to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not
just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of a
suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that
physical-chemical state. This means that the physical-chemical
state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain,
a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and
certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible
(physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible
creature that cannot feel pain” (Putman, 1967, 53).
The philosophers that support identity theory have only inade-
quately explained what they understand as mental states. It would
be, for example, conceivable not to simply identify unspecified
feelings of pain with one neurophysiological state, but rather
“sharp” pain, “dull” pain, etc. It would be equally possible, nat-
urally, to realize the classification of species-specific mental states.
Then human pain could be identified with the neurophysiological
state X, octopus pain with mollusc state Y, etc. Such species-
oriented reduction seems to weaken Putman’s argument. But even
if we restrict ourselves to examples of mental phenomena in
humans, it remains unlikely to be able to carry out identifica-
tion at a higher level of mental states. Consider, for example, a
desire to travel to London. This desire realizes itself clearly within
an entire web of other mental states: for instance the belief that
London lies in England; the belief that London is beautiful; the
knowledge that one has an important appointment there. Even
given all that we know about the brain, it appears hopeless ever to
be able to match such a state one-for-one with a neurophysiologi-
cal state. The brain (and also the respective mental state) is simply
too complex to be able to ascribe such identities9.
There is still the alternative of weakening statements of identity
by making the classification of mental states more finely granu-
lated. Hence it could be the case, for example that we can identify
a specific neurophysiological state with the mental state “sensing
an orange in a veiled and darkened room.” Yet here it would be
unclear what advantage would come of this kind of reduction.
9Beckermann (1996, 6) points out that after injuries to the brain many mental
processes of other parts of the brain, which previously were not involved, can
be realized. To an extent this would be an intrapersonal variation of the argu-
ment of multiple realization. In my opinion the neuroplasticity of the brain
is a general argument against the possibility of simple identification, which,
however, I will ignore.
The more that identity theory specifies the types of mental states
that they want to identify, the more they lose its original advan-
tage, namely its simplicity. But it does not necessarily follow from
the lack of plausibility of such type-identification that mental
phenomena are not, on particular levels, after all identical with
physical events. This is the proposition of the so-called token-
identity. This theory attributes the identity of every single mental
event (token), for example the belief of person X at time t that
it will rain today, to a single neurophysiological event. This is
admittedly an extremely weak identity thesis, but it guarantees the
maintenance of a non-dualistic position. Still, it apparently pre-
vents any reasonable reduction of the explanation of mental states
to physiological states, and is therefore inadequate as an argument
against the autonomy of the concept of mental illness.
There is a yet another way to understand type-identity: If every
realization of a type of mental states could be subsumed to a class
of neurophysiological states, then the argument of multiple real-
ization would be defeated. Suppose the belief that Berlin is the
capital of Germany would be realized in the respective neurophys-
iological states N1, N2, N3, etc. Due to this assumption multiple
realizability would be safeguarded, because the belief would not
always be identical to one and the same neurophysiological state.
If, however, N1, N2, N3, etc. could be subsumed to a class, then
a kind of type-identity would be saved (Rosenthal, 1994, 351;
Hannan, 1994, 21f.).
Maybe we could identify particular mental illnesses with dis-
tinct classes of neurophysiological states, in the sense that all real-
izations of a mental illness would fall under a neurophysiological
class. The following is an example: Suppose that schizophrenia in
person X were realized in neurophysiological state N(X), in per-
son Y in state N(Y), etc. Now it appears that N(X), N(Y), etc. all
belong to a distinct class S. Then it would evidently be possible to
reduce the explanation for schizophrenia to the class S. Whether
we can show that I cannot say, but the chances seem (theoret-
ically) not so bad 10. On the other hand the question remains
whether through S we have really explained and reduced the men-
tal phenomena-type schizophrenia completely. This is arguably
not the case. One important reason to me seems to be the fol-
lowing: To subsume such mental phenomena as “schizophrenia”
assumes that they have in common a particular property, namely
that they are cases of disorders of “normal” mental states. Even if
it were indeed the case that S underlies all these states, the mere
reference to S does not explain the pathology of the schizophrenic
realizations (see also Margolis, 1991). We only show that there is
a correlation between the mental states and a type of neurophysi-
ological states. The claim that all instances of S have the property
of realizing a disordered neurophysiological process is only possi-
ble on the psychological level of explanation. The fact that specific
10Practically there are certainly significant problems, for in order to show
that the single neurophysiological processes actually fall under a certain type
one has to acquire a detailed knowledge of them. However, “The more pre-
cisely one wants to establish neural state N as the origin of a behavior, the
greater does one change the brain and the overall situation of the test sub-
ject . . . ” (Tetens, 1992, p. 121). Tetens describes this as a “fuzziness relation”
of neurobiology, and argues “Already for this reason naturalistic descrip-
tions of the human being are not practically realizable alternatives to the
mental-psychological descriptions.”
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mental phenomena count as a mental illness cannot therefore be
explained exclusively through brain physiology. In this respect I
take the assertion that mental illnesses are brain illnesses (or dis-
eases, for that matter) to be truncated. The assertion conceals
that being ill is explained and only recognizable on the psycho-
logical level. A psychological explanation of mental illness is in
this regard autonomous in relation to physiological attempts at
explanation.
Even if all counterarguments up to now are not sufficient for a
complete repudiation of identity theory, can the theory ever show
itself to be true? The second of the objections to be presented
here focuses on the mental side of the identity thesis in replying
to the question introduced, i.e., the question about the possibil-
ity of reducing the mental to the physical level 11. Mental states
are normally grouped into so-called propositional attitudes (for
example desires, beliefs, hopes, which all have propositional con-
tent) and sensations (pain, sensual perception, etc.). We use this
classification in order to make actions comprehensible. If we see
someone running in the train station, then we understand this
behavior in that we ascribe to the person certain beliefs—for
example that the train is about to leave—and desires—that he
wants to board the train before it leaves. We can even make our
own actions comprehensible with these categories, such as in the
following example: “I took my hand away because I suddenly felt
a sharp pain.” At the same time there are certain principles that
guide our explanations, such as, for instance, if a person would
carry out action A when she has the chance, because she has
the desire X and believes that A will achieve X. Together these
categories and principles amount to an apparently useful basis
for the explanation and prediction of behavior. This is not an
especially complicated psychological theory that requires its own
field of study, but rather an accumulation of concepts and rules,
which are regularly used on an everyday basis. This tool has been
given the short-hand name “folk-psychology”12. Already for hun-
dreds of years—and long before anyone ever knew about brain
processes—this has been used by people, at least in a similar
form, in order to interpret their behaviors. Yet identity theory
claims that there is a one-to-one correspondence between neu-
rophysiological processes—any knowledge about which we have
only ever gathered in the last few decades—and the taxonomy of
folk-psychology. It seems more than unlikely, however, that cat-
egories that originated long before our knowledge of the brain
and nervous system can be precisely identified with correspond-
ing neurophysiological types of processes. It would be just about
as likely as a correspondence between the disease taxonomy of
Paracelsus and the newest insights into physiological processes in
the human body.
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
The results of this examination up to now suggest a certain skep-
ticism toward reductive theories in philosophy of the mind. To
11It can be found for example in Churchland (1988 p. 27 f.) This objection
is, as it will later become clear, not merely advanced against the plausibility of
identity theory, but also serves as an argument for eliminative materialism.
12Sometimes common-sense-psychology is also being used, because the
expression “folk psychology” has a pejorative connotation.
be sure, mental states are not on the one hand non-physiological
states, since they are apparently realized through physiological
processes in the brain. On the other hand the world of the
mental is not entirely physiologically explicable. “The desire to
drink a beer causes him to go into the pub.” “The detective
followed the murderer because he believed he wanted to hide
the weapon of the crime.” It is questionable how such com-
plex situations could be described meaningfully on a purely
physical level. In this regard we have levels of explanation that
are independent and irreducible. Folk-psychology works on this
level. But are its explanations correct? Proponents of Eliminative
Materialism (EM) answer this question in the negative13. Going
further, they actually come to the radical conclusion that these
states, which we and other creatures are ascribed to within the
framework of folk-psychology, do not exist. There are no desires,
beliefs, fears, etc. This thesis contains the eliminative side of EM.
Propositional attitudes (and even states of experience like feelings
of pain, here depending on what EM exactly sees as elements of
folk-psychology)14 are removed of their ontological legitimation,
whereby they are relegated to the sphere of myth.
This is a truly radical proposition, and I will try to illustrate
why it is not as unintelligible as it may at first seem. Certainly it
should be clear that—if EM is right—it would have equally radical
consequences for our conception of mental illness. If the sphere
of the mental, in the way that we describe and explain it every
day, is non-existent in the strictest sense, then this would really
revolutionize its conceptualization as well as the categorization of
single types of illnesses. Whether the mental disease concept in
its own independent framework would also be lost depends on
which level of explanation is chosen for the corresponding phe-
nomena. If there were a (future) scientific psychology that would
then replace the eliminated folk psychology, then talk of mental
disease would—in my opinion—still be warranted 15. However,
because the main supporters of EM want to see folk psychol-
ogy eliminated to the benefit of a (future) neurophysiology, it is
questionable whether there could still be mental illnesses in the
strictest sense16.
13The term “eliminative materialism” stems from Cornman (1968). It was
already used earlier in the sixties by Feyerabend (1970) and Rorty (1965) in
a similar form. The main supporters of a “modern” EM are Patricia and Paul
Churchland.
14Sometimes only propositional attitudes are attributed to folk psychology.
Hannan (1994, p. 45) points out that supporters of EM are often less critical
of qualitative states. But Churchland (1994, (308) explicitly specifies pain for
example as a component of folk psychology).
15Naturally I do not want to claim that the future psychology will manage
without any reference to physiological and chemical processes in the brain.
Already today the borders are fluid. The independence of the concept of men-
tal illness would be kept alive in the maintenance of a genuine psychological
terminology in this science. An attempt to discuss the theory of EM from a
psychiatric point of view is undertaken by Harrison (1991).
16In this regard EM as such is not a threat to the mental illness concept (even
if for today’s existing classification of mental illnesses), but rather only in
a certain version. Some arguments for why a future science of mental phe-
nomena should not be exclusively located on a neural level can be found in
Kitcher (1996). To be sure, it is not always clear from the Churchlands’ writ-
ings whether they expect the elimination of psychology in general or of only
folk psychology.
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The discussion concerning EM’s persuasiveness is therefore
linked primarily to the status of folk psychology. Ironically the lat-
ter’s irreducibility becomes a symptom of its superfluity. Because
mental states are based on physical states, a neurophysiological
explanation should support the folk-psychological explanation.
That was also the claim of identity theory. Now it has been
shown, however, that explanations on the level of folk psy-
chology cannot be reduced to a neurophysiological level. And
precisely because this irreducibility relation exists, it can be
shown that folk psychology and neurophysiology are incommen-
surable. Temperature could be successfully reduced to molecular
kinetic energy, and therefore can continue to be seen as existing.
Conversely, no one could find a scientific explanation for witches
that were commensurable with superstition, and so witches count
as non-existing. The more we learn about the functionality of the
brain the clearer it becomes that there are practically no equivoca-
tions to be made from the folk-psychologically explained mental
states to neurophysiological levels. But when two approaches of
explanation are incompatible, then it is to be taken that at least
one is false, in which case it should be discarded. The claim of EM
is naturally that folk psychology is false and therefore has to dis-
appear. To this degree mental states go the way of witches: They
are expelled from the scientific ontology.
In short, EM consists of two premises and one conclusion
(cf. Stich, 1996, 4). Premise 1: Folk psychology is a theory.
Premise 2: Folk psychology is false. Conclusion: The mental states
postulated by folk psychology do not exist and can play no role in
any future explanation of behavior.
Which objections are addressed toward EM?17 Its first premise
pertains to the form of folk psychology: Does it really repre-
sent a theory? This claim is essential for EM’s proposition, for
otherwise it would be questionable why we should drop folk
psychology. The assumption of EM is that folk psychology aims
to provide explanations and predictions of behavior, and there-
fore contains certain claims and supports certain principles, etc.
If this were not the case, then it would not compete with a
neurological explanation of the same issue, and would therefore
not be an eligible candidate for elimination. It seems to me, on
the basis of the already discussed need for a psychological per-
spective to establish distinct mental disorders that we cannot
abandon the corresponding vocabulary and its related theoretical
constructs.
The second premise of EM states that folk psychology as a the-
ory is false, because it leaves many phenomena unexplained and
is therefore incompatible with the underlying natural sciences:
“(. . .) what we must say is that FP [folk psychology, TS] suffers
explanatory failures on an epic scale that it has been stagnant
17One objection to EM that I do not find convincing, but will mention for
the sake of thoroughness, is that it is self-defeating: The theory of EM con-
tains the premise that beliefs, etc. do not exist. It is objected that one can only
sensible formulate this premise, however, with recourse to the affected states
themselves, for example beliefs. To me this objection seems to be begging the
question, because it assumes the same manner of speaking that is put in ques-
tion. An expression of the theses of EM may very well radically change, once
folk psychology is eliminated. Hannan (1994, p. 62 ff.) puts more faith in this
objection. For a defense against this charge see Churchland (1986, p. 397 f.);
Churchland (1988, p. 48).
for at least twenty-five centuries, and that its categories appear
(so far) to be incommensurable with or orthogonal to the cate-
gories of the background physical science whose long term claim
to explain human behavior seems undeniable. Any theory that
meets this description must be allowed a serious candidate for
outright elimination” (Churchland, 1981, 212).
Churchland sees shortcomings to the explanations of folk psy-
chology in the areas of, e.g., creativity, intelligence, sleep,memory,
sensory illusions, and—especially interesting for our analysis—
in relation to mental illness. This suggestion of Churchland’s is
not easy to counter. It seems true that we can learn fairly little
about mental illness through the help of folk-psychological con-
ceptions and principles. But does folk psychology even have this
aim? A theory can only be untrue in that area where it claims to
have explanatory value. Otherwise it does not at all seek to com-
pete with other theories such as neurophysiology or a “scientific”
psychology.
Churchland’s claim that folk psychology breaks down or fails
as a theory apparently stems from the assumption that it does
compete with neurophysiology. Then it would be an appropriate
candidate for elimination. But this assumption is not straightfor-
ward. First the role and aim of folk psychology would have to be
clarified. There is much to indicate that even when it is not all
that successful as a theory, neither is it so false that it has to be
eliminated, nor does it have to be replaced by a (future) neuro-
physiology. Even if it is replaced, it would be done so by a scientific
theory that is situated on the same level of explanation—that is,
a psychological one. Folk psychology works on a macro level, and
neurophysiology on a micro level. In this regard the irreducibility
of folk psychology does not necessarily lead to its incommen-
surability with neurophysiology. Each explains phenomena, but
simply on two different levels of abstraction.
Psychiatric explanations of disease phenomena would not
manage without psychological conceptions. Which role folk psy-
chology will keep in the process is still undecided; but to eliminate
it is neither necessary on theoretical grounds nor advisable on
practical grounds, for it is through its coarse grain that in the end
the psychological perspective facilitates our access to the mental
world.
CONCLUSION
The reductive and eliminative theories of the mind-body prob-
lem are not convincing. The reductive versions largely fail for
the lack of correlation between types of mental and neurophys-
iological states. Identity theory seems to apply on the level of
single mental events. Thereby, however, only an ontologically
non-dualistic position is implied, and not at all the superfluity
of mental terminology. On the contrary, mental illness is one of
the very phenomena that would be unexplainable on an exclu-
sively neurophysiological level, because here no explanation of
a single event (token) is being sought, and because the ascrip-
tion of pathology itself can only happen by taking the mental
level into account. The eliminative position fails largely due to
its ascription to unreasonably high expectations on the part of
folk psychology. Sure it is unlikely that we can adequately explain
mental illness with folk-psychological terminology alone. But
this finding neither makes folk psychology as such superfluous
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nor excludes the possibility of a scientific and therefore psy-
chological (and specifically psychiatric) explanation of mental
illness.
The concept of mental illness was drawn into question on the
basis of reductive and eliminative theories. As a consequence the
rejection of these accounts leads to the possibility of an indepen-
dent conceptualization of mental illness—so long as no further,
more convincing objections are brought forward. To be sure, the
difficulties of substance dualism prevent any possible explanation
of mental illness to be completely independent of physiological
knowledge. Mental and bodily phenomena do not belong to prin-
cipally separate areas. In this regard both the general rejection and
the one-sided restriction to brain-physiological explanations of
mental illness fail. In brief, even if we have accepted that theo-
ries of mental illness are not allowed to be in conflict with the
knowledge of neurophysiology, it does not follow that the single
(let alone the best) explanation of mental illness can exist on a
neurophysiological level.
Even if for many disorders of the mental apparatus no corre-
sponding disorders of brain-physiological processes were found,
the language of mental illness does not seem to me to have
necessarily failed. The desire for “objective” signs of disease, as
they are supposed to be in the brain or in observable behaviors,
is understandable. Nevertheless, this is in the end a method-
ological problem that is posed for a future scientific study of
18This article was mentioned on the DSM-5 website as background for the
planned revision of the definition of “mental disorder”: http://www.dsm5.
org/proposedrevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465# [Accessed 14.
September 2012]. The reference has since been deleted from the website.
mental illness. It should not lead to discounting any of the two—
neurophysiological or mental—perspectives. Mental illness is not
reducible to brain illness, even when mental phenomena have
their basis in the brain.
The recent publication of the fifth version of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders should cause occa-
sion for the underlying philosophical aspects of the language of
mental disorder to make itself clear within the psychiatric trade.
The chairpersons of the working committee that put together the
DSM-IV had still formulated the following misgivings: “There
could arguably not be a worse term than mental disorders to
describe the conditions classified in DSM-IV. Mental implies a
mind-body dichotomy that is becoming increasingly outmoded
(. . . )” (Frances, 1994, VIII). We should have expected that such
mistaken misgivings—which are after all concerning the very
foundations of psychiatry—would be resolved by now. A cursory
look at current psychiatric publications, however, gives us cause
to fear that the same error in reasoning will be made as before:
“‘Mental’ implies a Cartesian view of the mind-body problem
that minds and brains are separable and entirely distinct realms,
an approach that is inconsistent with modern philosophical and
neuroscientific views” (Stein et al., 2010, 1760) (18). In this respect
we surely have to be skeptical that psychiatric thinking will have
seriously progressed. Instead the cure will very likely be looked
for in neurobiology. In this article I have attempted to show why
psychiatry will not find here what it is looking for and that there is
no need to look for a supposed cure, since the concept of mental
illness is autonomous from somatic medicine. For philosophers
this is no surprising realization; for many psychiatrists, however,
the insight seems to remain closed off.
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